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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

Confidential

9 SEPTEMBER 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 36)

This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in communist broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 30 AUGUST - 5 SEPTEMBER 1971

Moscow (2805 items)

Indochina	(5%)	17%
[DRV National Day	(--)	10%]
[Podgorny October	(--)	2%]
Visit to DRV		
China	(8%)	7%
[I. Aleksandrov	(--)	3%]
PRAVDA Article		
West Berlin Accord	(1%)	5%
U.S. Economic	(7%)	3%
Measures		

Peking (1544 items)

Indochina	(20%)	42%
[DRV August Revolution	(2%)	23%]
Anniversary, National		
Day		
[Laos	(2%)	8%]
Domestic Issues	(33%)	25%
PRC Military Delegation	(5%)	5%
in Romania		
Japan-China Friendship	(--)	4%
Association Meeting,		
Tokyo		
Uganda-Tanzania Border	(--)	3%
Incident		
PRC UN Seat	(11%)	2%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Hanoi propaganda calling for all-out flood-control efforts and protection of lives and property registers the DRV's serious concern over the damage caused by the recent floods in North Vietnam. The unusual severity of this year's flooding was recognized in Premier Pham Van Dong's 31 August DRV National Day address when he described the floods as even worse than the "catastrophic" ones of 1945. Hanoi media have publicized a succession of official proclamations on how to cope with the flooding, as well as almost daily press editorials on the subject. Messages of sympathy and offers of assistance have come from the PRC, USSR, and other communist allies.

Further Hanoi propaganda on DRV National Day reaffirms basic policies and reiterates attacks on U.S. failure to respond to the PRG's 1 July peace proposal, which Pham Van Dong said was advanced at a notably propitious time. His optimistic comments on the military situation in the South accord with recent scattered claims in the propaganda that the worst of the war is over.

Moscow has emphasized its aid to Vietnam in continuing propaganda on the DRV anniversary, including a 2 September PRAVDA article by the deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations. Concurrently, Moscow pursues its propaganda assault on Peking's Indochina policies. An authoritative I. Aleksandrov article in the 4 September PRAVDA, calling for a closing of communist ranks against Chinese splittist policies, includes passages playing on Hanoi's fears that Peking might sell out the North Vietnamese.

Peking has reassured the Vietnamese that their interests are not jeopardized by current Sino-U.S. developments. In an unexpected PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the DRV's anniversary, the Chinese again endorsed the PRG's seven-point peace proposal while deriding speculation about a new Geneva conference. PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng's speech on the anniversary, however, reflected Peking's broader interests in its restraint toward the United States.

HANOI MARKS NATIONAL DAY, ANNIVERSARY OF HO CHI MINH'S DEATH

The 2 September DRV National Day was marked as usual this year with a meeting addressed by Premier Pham Van Dong on 31 August, a wreath-laying ceremony at Hanoi's military cemetery on 1 September, and

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editorial comment in the press on the 2d. Pham Van Dong's speech and other anniversary comment reaffirmed basic DRV policies, with Dong reviewing Vietnamese communist diplomatic initiatives in the past few years and stating that the latest proposal, advanced by the PRG on 1 July, has come at a time when "the situation has matured in the unfolding of the war and in the minds of the people for advancing to a solution" of the war.* Dong claimed that "very seldom in a fierce and complicated confrontation like this war has a solution put forth by one side enjoyed such wide and deep response, even among political circles in the United States."

The DRV premier went on to score the U.S. Administration for not responding positively to the PRG proposal, despite opposition to the war in the United States and the alleged failure of Vietnamization. He attacked the Administration for refusing to "declare in a clearcut way to withdraw all U.S. troops" and for failing to recognize the South Vietnamese right to self-determination, in this context decrying the U.S. attitude toward the GVN elections. "It is clear," he said, "that Nixon does not want to talk seriously to settle the Vietnam question on the basis of the seven points, although he has no legitimate reason to reject" the proposal.

While warning that "the enemy may cause us new difficulties," Dong spoke optimistically about the progress of the war. He said that "a very new and very inspiring thing" about the war in the South is that "everyone has seen" that the enemy has "already lost the game and that its days are numbered. More remarkable still, the enemy itself is believing so." Dong's characterization of the war situation is consistent with recent scattered claims in Hanoi propaganda that the worst of the war is over.** The same view was suggested in the 2 September NHAN DAN anniversary editorial, which held that the "peak of U.S. war escalation" ended in the spring of 1968 and cannot be reached again. The editorial maintained that President Nixon cannot reverse the trend of the war and that "there is limited time" at his disposal.

* See the 1 September TRENDS, page 1, for a report on Dong's remarks dealing with relations with other communist countries.

** Such claims are noted in the 25 August TRENDS, page 5.

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DRV LEADERSHIP The DRV National Day meeting and a memorial service marking the anniversary of Ho's death prompted appearances by all of the North Vietnamese party's Politburo members except Pham Hung, who has been absent from public functions for the last four years, and Hoang Van Hoan, currently leading a National Assembly delegation visiting the USSR and Eastern Europe. Truong Chinh delivered the opening remarks at the meeting; he has performed this function in previous years except on last year's 25th national day, when President Ton Duc Thang spoke. Politburo member Le Duc Tho and alternate members Tran Quoc Hoan and Van Tien Dung were not listed among those present at the national day observances, but all were reported as attending the 3 September memorial service marking the second anniversary of Ho's death.

The 3 September NHAN DAN editorial on the anniversary of Ho's death, like the party paper's editorial last year, reviewed efforts to carry out the wishes expressed in Ho's testament. Among other things, it recalled Ho's concern with party unity and asserted that "the strengthening of the solidarity and unanimity of the entire party under the clear-sighted leadership of the party Central Committee has an extremely important significance."

PHAM VAN DONG REVIEWS ACHIEVEMENTS, DISCUSSES FLOOD DISASTER

In the pattern of his national day speeches in previous years, Pham Van Dong on 31 August routinely reviewed achievements in agriculture, industry, communications and transportation, education, and other domestic spheres. Recalling that the 19th plenum of the VWP Central Committee had "laid down great, urgent and immediate tasks" for the war and for building the North's economy, Dong singled out the development of agriculture and the improvement of economic management as special goals. In line with earlier propaganda references to large crop yields, he asserted that the 1970-71 winter-spring rice crop recorded "unprecedented results in acreage, crop yield, and total output" and that "the target of five tons of paddy per hectare per year is becoming more and more a reality in North Vietnam." The goal of producing five tons of paddy per hectare annually has been given wide attention in Hanoi media since the fall of 1965, when it was first advocated at government and party conferences on agriculture.

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In the area of the management of the economy, the DRV premier called for "big efforts" from central organs to basic units to improve the quality of management, first of all in drafting the 1972 state plan. He said special importance must be attached to organizational work and the use of cadres: "We must step up and improve our organization, raise the efficiency of the managerial system, train and foster factory management cadres, assign cadres to the right places according to their abilities, and foster an increasing contingent of skilled workers."

Largely ignoring defense issues, Dong routinely reminded his audience that the North must "constantly heighten vigilance, strengthen the people's armed forces, uphold the duty of defending the homeland and the gains of the socialist revolution in the North, and stand ready to fight and fight well."

**UNPRECEDENTED
FLOODS IN DRV** Pham Van Dong's national day speech provided the first substantial propaganda recognition of the unusual severity of the recent floods in North Vietnam. The premier stated that in recent weeks the DRV "has been affected by a very big flood, even bigger than that of 1945, which was a catastrophe." According to Dong, waters from the flooded streams in the northern part of the DRV have caused "water in the entire system of the Red River and Thai Binh River to rise to an unprecedented level, while heavy downpours in the delta caused added difficulties for the defense of the dike system and the combat against inundation."

Dong claimed that the flood-fighting efforts had "in the main triumphed over the flood and warded off a big disaster," but he acknowledged that "many areas in the midlands and delta have been submerged" and that there have been losses in agriculture, communications and transport, and property. Warning that "at present the water level remains high and the weather may change abruptly" and that resolute efforts to defend the dike system and combat floods must continue, he urged that all forces be mobilized and urgent steps be taken to step up winter crop cultivation in the areas spared by the flood and to replant the fields in the stricken areas.

Dong also called for the speediest possible restoration of main roads and attention to "the paramount role of communications and transport in the present conditions." He called it "extremely urgent" that the people in flood-stricken areas be provided with

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adequate care--food, housing and disease prevention. Efforts to overcome the floods, he said, must be carried out along with efforts to fulfill the 1971 state plan: "In the next dry season, we must gain time to step up all activities of the national economy, capital construction in particular."

PROPAGANDA CALLS FOR FLOOD CONTROL, PROTECTION OF POPULACE

The disastrous nature of North Vietnam's floods, directly acknowledged in Pham Van Dong's national day address, has been reflected in a series of official party and government statements and editorials in the central press. And the concern of Hanoi's leaders was further underscored on 9 September when DRV media publicized inspection tours of flooded areas by Le Duan, Truong Chinh, and Pham Van Dong. The report on the leaders' visits briefly noted their remarks to the populace, saying Le Duan stressed that it was "essential" to "save human lives" and observed that "as long as there are men, there is everything." Pham Van Dong, according to the report, assured his audience that difficulties would be surmounted "despite the inundation of vast areas."

OFFICIAL DIRECTIVES The first official directive on the floods was an "instruction" from the premier, reported by Hanoi radio on 26 August, which called for the protection of state, cooperative, and private property in flood-stricken areas and warned of punishment for anyone who took advantage of the floods to perpetrate theft. A joint meeting of the North Vietnamese party (VWP) Central Committee Secretariat and the Council of Ministers Standing Committee at about the same time in August drafted a resolution spelling out tasks to overcome the floods and called for efforts to restore production. The joint resolution was first detailed in a Hanoi broadcast on 1 September. The date of issue of the resolution has been indicated only in an undated instruction on an emulation drive to overcome the consequences of the floods, issued by the Emulation Department of the Central Committee and broadcast on 7 September. The instruction referred without further explanation to two resolutions of the Secretariat and the Council of Ministers Standing Committee dated 25 and 27 August.

Further instructions from the premier, detailing actions needed to "overcome difficulties in regard to the people's livelihood" in flooded areas, were publicized in a Hanoi

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broadcast on 2 September. And on the 9th Hanoi reported that the National Assembly Standing Committee had met the previous day, chaired by Truong Chinh, and heard a report on the floods and rehabilitation work.

EXTENT OF DISASTER The many official statements on the floods and accompanying propaganda--including eight NHAN DAN editorials on the subject since 25 August--provide little in the way of concrete details on the flood situation. The general nature of the problem is indicated, however, in repeated references to the need to evacuate people and provide them with food, shelter, and medical care and in emphasis on the importance of resuming all-out efforts in agricultural production as soon as possible.

The extent of the evacuation effort is indicated, for example, in a 1 September NHAN DAN editorial which specifies that transportation operations have continued day and night and notes that planes have been used in some areas for rescue missions and distribution of foodstuffs. An 8 September NHAN DAN editorial on medical tasks similarly suggests the severity of the problems, calling on public health personnel to work in shifts around the clock to organize rescue operations, give first aid, and care for patients. It notes that special efforts will have to be made to prevent epidemics, especially after the flood waters recede.

Agricultural losses due to the floods have evidently been widespread. A 4 September NHAN DAN editorial, urging that crops be replanted as soon as the flood waters recede, is most explicit about the extent of damage when it states that "the flooded areas embrace the majority of the ricefields."

In an apparent effort to counter a defeatist attitude that would result in incorrect planting of crops, the NHAN DAN editorial recalls that a good harvest had been reaped from the crops replanted after the severe floods in 1968* and disputes the

* Hanoi comment during the period of flooding in 1968 noted that some of the rivers that year were higher than in 1945--the year Pham Van Dong used as his base of comparison in the current national day address. The head of the Directorate of Dikes, Duong Ngoc Vo, declared in 1968 that the DRV that year was experiencing the worst year for floods and storms since the restoration of peace in 1954. For comment on the floods during 1969 and background on propaganda treatment of the 1968 floods, see the FBIS SURVEY of 28 August 1969, pages 11-13.

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view that rice crops produce low yields if they are planted late. Arguing against this "incorrect view," which prompts some people to plant subsidiary crops after the flooding, it says "experience as well as scientific research demonstrate that the 10th-month crop, if planted late in September, can produce a good harvest provided proper techniques are used."

USSR, PRC Successive VNA reports in the same transmission
ASSISTANCE on 4 September publicized messages of sympathy
 and promises of aid from the USSR and PRC. The
Soviet message, according to VNA, was dated 30 August and came from the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the Council of Ministers. VNA noted that it expressed "sincerest sympathy" and said that "as an initial aid to the victims, the Soviet Red Cross is sending emergency relief to the DRV including food, medicine, textiles, and tents."

The ensuing VNA report of the Chinese offers noted that Chou En-lai had sent messages to Pham Van Dong on 25 and 29 August conveying the "great concern" of Chairman Mao, Lin Piao, and the party, government, and people of China and announcing "measures taken by China to come to the Vietnamese people's relief." A third message sent on 2 September, this time from all three PRC leaders, was quoted in the VNA report as referring to China and Vietnam as "intimate neighbors" and the two peoples as "comrades in arms and brothers" and as pledging that the Chinese people "will do their utmost to help the fraternal Vietnamese people to triumph over the current floods."*

GVN OFFER VNA and LPA on 8 September scathingly rejected the
 offer of assistance made by the GVN Foreign
Ministry through the International Red Cross on the 6th. Hanoi radio in Vietnamese to South Vietnam on the 8th broadcast a VNA authorized statement, issued the same day, denouncing "this offer-of-assistance farce" as a "brazen deceitful trick" aimed at masking the real nature of the U.S.-GVN allies and their "war crimes." It also called the offer one of Thieu's "crafty tricks aimed at scraping up the property of our compatriots in South Vietnam and at misleading the struggle of the South Vietnamese people, who are resolutely opposing his deceitful election farce."

* Peking media have been heard to publicize only the message of 2 September.

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About an hour later Liberation Radio broadcast an LPA authorized statement charging that the Thieu administration "is resorting to the trick of providing material assistance for the compatriot flood victims in the North and is unleashing donation drives in the cities and in the other areas under its temporary control." Scoring this "odious, hypocritical trick" to cover U.S.-GVN "crimes" and to enhance Thieu's image in the election campaign, it also brands the offer "a dishonest and cruel trick to take advantage of the southern compatriots' sacred sentiment toward the kith-and-kin North in order to step up exploitation of the people."

Stating that the South Vietnamese people are "resolved to boycott all the relief drives and organizations" created by Thieu and "not to fall into this deceitful trap," the LPA statement says the South Vietnamese people are determined to devote their human and material resources to the resistance as "the most realistic way to help" the flood victims. It expresses the conviction that the northern compatriots, "with the great assistance of the socialist countries," can overcome the floods, restore production, "and fulfill the vast rearbase's noble duty to the vast frontline under all circumstances."

PEKING REASSURES HANOI, DERIDES IDEA OF NEW GENEVA PARLEY

Peking has taken the occasion of the DRV's 26th anniversary to reassure the Vietnamese that their interests are not jeopardized by current Sino-U.S. developments. This message was conveyed in editorial support for the PRG's seven-point peace proposal, coupled with what amounts to a denial that the PRC is contemplating a new Geneva conference to arrange a Vietnam settlement. Peking departed from the standard pattern by marking the anniversary with a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, evidently as a vehicle for reassuring Hanoi. There was an editorial last year on the 25th anniversary, an occasion calling for special treatment, but none on the 24th anniversary in 1969. Otherwise the observance this year has been like that of 1969.

While reaffirming Peking's endorsement of the PRG's 1 July proposal as "the correct way to a peaceful settlement" in Vietnam, PEOPLE'S DAILY accused "U.S. imperialism" of "evading a reply" to the proposal and of spreading "words

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about the convening of a Geneva conference" in an effort to obstruct a peaceful settlement. This represented Peking's second attempt in recent authoritative comment to take the wind out of speculation about a wider conference to deal with the Vietnam question. A 3 August PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article had done the same thing in expressing support for Prince Sihanouk's angry denunciation of this line of speculation.*

As in other recent comment, including the Chinese leaders' message on the anniversary, the 2 September editorial got in a jab at the Nixon Doctrine--a major target in Hanoi's polemics against Peking's invitation to the President--in the course of an attack on the United States for allegedly intensifying the war in Indochina, refusing to announce a date for withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam, and pursuing "the 'Vietnamization' scheme and the 'Nixon Doctrine' of making Asians fight Asians." The editorial also seemed responsive to Hanoi's polemics in its characterization--within a wide historical context--of "the U.S. imperialist aggressors" as "the most ferocious in our epoch." After noting that Sino-Vietnamese solidarity had been "personally cultivated" by Mao and Ho Chi Minh and "can stand the test of any storm," the editorial reaffirmed the PRC's "unswerving policy" of rendering "all-out support" to the Vietnamese until "complete victory."

While the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial seemed designed to reassure the Vietnamese, the speech by PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng at the 2 September DRV embassy reception on the anniversary reflected the restraint currently marking Peking's comment on the United States. Huang made no mention of the Nixon Administration or of a Vietnam settlement, taking the occasion rather to express concern over recent floods in North Vietnam and to offer pro forma support for the Vietnamese in their "war of resistance." Echoing the Chinese leaders' message, he described the Vietnamese situation as "unprecedentedly fine"--a characterization which grew out of the Lam Son 719 operation and which justifies a broader Chinese maneuverability in Asia. Last year on this occasion Chou roundly attacked the United

* In an interview published in the Yugoslav paper VJESNIK on 28 August, Chou En-lai said that there is no need for a new Geneva conference and that the Vietnam question must be settled between the Vietnamese and the United States.

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States for being "the most ferocious imperialism" of the present era and for "practicing political deception and contriving peace-talk schemes."

MOSCOW STRESSES ITS AID TO DRV, ATTACKS CHINESE POLICIES

Moscow propaganda on DRV National Day includes a 2 September PRAVDA article by I. Arkhipov, deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, which reviews Soviet aid to the DRV in some detail in the vein of other recent Moscow comment, including Vice Premier Novikov's speech at the Moscow meeting on the DRV anniversary.* The article again notes Soviet help in the building of various enterprises in the DRV, the assistance of Soviet specialists in Vietnam, and the training of Vietnamese in the USSR. It also again points up Soviet military aid, the "basis" for the DRV's air defense.

Documenting Soviet political support for the DRV, the Arkhipov article notes that the USSR "played a important role in convening and achieving the success of the Geneva conference." But it does not go on to claim--as did a 30 August Moscow radio talk in foreign languages on Podgornyy's forthcoming visit to the DRV--that the Soviet Union "took the initiative" in convening the Geneva conference and that Ho Chi Minh "highly estimated" the Soviet Union's role. The reference to Soviet "initiative" had been at variance with the USSR's usual line of recalling, in the context of appeals to Peking for communist unity in support of Vietnam, the Sino-Soviet cooperation at the 1954 Geneva conference as an example of how united action can thwart U.S. "aggression."

The PRAVDA article cites expressions of gratitude for Soviet assistance by DRV leaders; and the DRV ambassador, in his usual Moscow TV interview on DRV National Day, praised Soviet aid and added that Podgornyy's forthcoming visit to the DRV will help strengthen the "combat solidarity and fraternal friendship" of the two parties and peoples.

* See the 1 September TRENDS, pages 4-5, for a discussion of Moscow's initial comment on the DRV anniversary, including the leaders' message and Moscow meeting.

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Moscow's reports of anniversary activities in Hanoi include a 4 September TASS summary of Pham Van Dong's 31 August speech. TASS briefly notes that Pham "stressed the great significance of the material and moral support given by the socialist countries" and "expressed gratitude for it," obscuring the fact that he did not specifically thank the socialist countries for their aid but rather said pointedly that the DRV had "won" the assistance of the USSR and PRC through its correct line in holding the diplomatic and military initiative.

Continuing Soviet attacks on Peking's Vietnam policies include passages in the 4 September PRAVDA article by I. Aleksandrov broadly attacking Peking's divisive policies.* Again playing on Hanoi's suspicions that Peking might sell it out, Aleksandrov asks if "a deal against socialism" is not being prepared behind the scenes in Peking and Washington, "a deal at the expense of the interests of the peoples fighting for national independence and freedom." Routine Soviet radio comment in Mandarin continues to charge that Peking's invitation to President Nixon to visit China permits him to postpone a reply to the PRG's peace proposal. A 3 September commentary again attacks Chou En-lai for failing, in his interview with the New York TIMES' James Reston, to demand that the United States stop sabotaging the Paris talks and withdraw its troops from Vietnam by a definite date. It repeats the charge that Chou is thus "serving" Washington and "impairing" the Vietnamese people's struggle.

DELEGATION OF SIHANOUK'S FRONT VISITS USSR TO IMPROVE TIES

The arrival in the USSR of a delegation of Sihanouk's National United Front of Kampuchea (FUNK) led by Politburo member Gen. Duong Sam Ol represents a continuation of the Sihanouk government's persistent quest for Soviet recognition and is being used by Peking to twit the Soviets on this issue. Moscow has adhered to past practice in hosting the delegation at the "solidarity committee" level and has exhibited no intention so far of altering its practice of virtually ignoring Sihanouk's Royal Government of National Union (RGNU).

* See the Sino-Soviet Relations section of this TRENDS for a discussion of the article.

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The arrival of the delegation on 1 September was first reported in a Moscow broadcast which said without elaboration that it had come at the invitation of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. The FUNK Radio first announced the visit in a 2 September broadcast which said the delegation will "try" to strengthen ties between the Soviet and Cambodian people and will "also try to create favorable conditions to obtain the the USSR Government's recognition of the RGNU." Unlike Moscow, the FUNK broadcast used Duong Sam Ol's government title, Minister of Military Equipment and Armament, as well as his FUNK title. NCNA publicized the visit on 4 September by carrying a FUNK "press communique" dated 30 August which announced the visit and noted pointedly that the delegation would tell the Soviet people that the RGNU now controls eight-tenths of the country's territory, with nearly five million inhabitants, and that 28 countries have already recognized it.

SOVIET COVERAGE In a moderate amount of publicity for the visit, Moscow has nowhere mentioned the RGNU on its own authority, citing the delegation's FUNK credentials only. Some Radio Moscow broadcasts, in Cambodian only, have quoted Duong Sam Ol as praising the policies and growing influence of the RGNU and as referring to Sihanouk as Cambodian head of state. But in PRAVDA on 4 September, Duong is quoted as referring in an interview to "Prince Sihanouk" with no further title. TASS has quoted Duong Sam Ol on several occasions as saying he has come to thank the Soviet people for their support of the Cambodian people's struggle and to inform them of "the real state of affairs" in Cambodia.

A 9 September PRAVDA article, as summarized by TASS, expresses the Soviet people's approval of the struggle of "the Cambodian people" under the leadership of "a militant political organization," the FUNK. It acknowledges that according to data provided by "the leadership of the Front," the liberated zone of Cambodia now includes eight-tenths of the country's territory with a population of five million. It says that "people's power bodies" are being formed at all levels, that "democratic transformations" are being made, and that the "foundations of a future free Cambodia are being laid," but PRAVDA still avoids mentioning the RGNU.

The delegation so far has not been received by any Soviet central government officials, although it did meet during a side trip with the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Uzbekistan. Statements by officials of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity

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Committee in connection with the visit have been limited to routine expressions of support for the "just struggle of the Cambodian patriots" and for the FUNK as leader of that struggle. They mention neither Sihanouk nor Lon Nol, although the secretary of the committee, in a statement broadcast by Radio Moscow in Cambodian on 1 September, referred briefly to the "coup d'etat of the rightist forces in Phnom Penh" which "allowed the United States to gain political and military control in Cambodia."

BACKGROUND Moscow media have rarely mentioned the RGNU since TASS reported its proclamation in a 6 May 1970 report. Such mentions as have occurred have usually been in connection with visits by its officials. The highest-level Soviet treatment of a RGNU minister was accorded to Thiounn Mumm when he was received by Soviet deputy foreign ministers during visits to the USSR in June and December 1970. On 29 June 1970, reporting that Thiounn Mumm was received by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Firubin, TASS acknowledged his title of "Minister of Economy and Finance of the RGNU," but other reports of his week-long visit identified him only as a FUNK Politburo member. On 29 December 1970, reporting that Deputy Foreign Minister Kozyrev received Thiounn Mumm the day before, PRAVDA identified him as Minister of Economy and Finance but did not mention the RGNU.

On 30 October 1970 a Moscow domestic service report said a delegation of the "Cambodian national front" attended a Moscow meeting sponsored by solidarity committees to mark a week of solidarity with the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The radio report, the only available publicity for the delegation, said that the group was headed by Thiounn Prasith, "Minister for Coordination of Struggle for National Liberation of the Royal Government."

Although Moscow never withdrew recognition from Chea San, the Sihanouk government's ambassador in Moscow as well as its Minister of Justice, Moscow has referred to him infrequently and without mentioning the RGNU. Thus, for example, PRAVDA on 26 February 1971 published a TASS report that Chea San, "Cambodian ambassador in the Soviet Union," attended a solidarity meeting that day. On 24 March 1971 a Moscow Radio broadcast in Cambodian reported that "the embassy representing FUNK" had received a number of solidarity messages from Soviet workers; and on 29 April TASS reported a Moscow solidarity meeting attended by "Cambodian ambassador" Chea San.

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COMMUNISTS SCORE THIEU DECISION TO RUN UNOPPOSED IN ELECTION

Hanoi and Liberation Front media have predictably denounced President Thieu's 2 September speech in which he announced that the presidential election would be held as scheduled on 3 October even though his slate would be the only one on the ballot. The communist reaction was highlighted by a 5 September NHAN DAN article which maintained that the United States is backing Thieu's stance although Washington had hoped to cover the election "farce" with a "facade" of democracy. The article did not mention Thieu's promise to resign if the vote does not demonstrate that he has the people's confidence, but this pledge is noted and disparaged in other Hanoi and Front comment.

The 5 September NHAN DAN article asserted that the Nixon Administration is committed to keeping Thieu in power and, as evidence, incorrectly claimed that Secretary Rogers, in his 3 September press conference, characterized Thieu's decision to run alone as "encouraging." Despite such remarks, the article asserted, the "crisis" in Saigon "cannot be concealed and becomes even more apparent." The article maintained that the United States has failed to establish a "viable stooge administration" despite three years of Vietnamization and that Thieu is so isolated that "he has to resort to naked dictatorship to assure his survival."

The NHAN DAN article predicted that "compatriots" in the allied-controlled areas in South Vietnam will "oppose" the election "farce," but it did not suggest more specific action. Liberation Radio commentaries have claimed that there is a growing movement in the South demanding that Thieu resign in order for a "just" election to take place. And Front media, on 1 and 2 September, publicized the formation of a "Popular Front Against Elections," reportedly including supporters of the former candidates Ky and Minh, which is said to be calling for the boycott of the election. Liberation Radio on the 1st also reported that "compatriots" in Saigon have "demanded that the right to organize the election be handed over to a central committee composed of the representatives of the various religious and patriotic organizations." According to the radio, a number of organizations are "actively working for the formation of a people's committee for national conciliation" which will demand Thieu resign, that Ambassador Bunker go home and that a national conciliation government be formed.

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

ALEKSANDROV ARTICLE SIGNALS INTENSIFIED ANTI-CHINA POLEMIC

Moscow's concern over the impact of the newly flexible Chinese tactics and its intensified effort to counter them are reflected in a major article in PRAVDA over the authoritative signature of I. Aleksandrov, the second in less than two months, which sharpens the Soviet attack on Peking and calls for a closing of communist ranks in the face of Chinese divisive activities. The earlier Aleksandrov article, on 25 July, conveyed Moscow's first authoritative reaction to the announcement of the President's decision to visit Peking; along with the ensuing major article by Georgiy Arbatov in the 10 August PRAVDA, its context was the Sino-Soviet-U.S. triangular relationship--the possible impact of Sino-U.S. detente on relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. The current article seems addressed primarily to the international communist movement.

The TASS international service underscored the importance of the article by disseminating it in full text the night before it appeared in the Soviet party organ on 4 September. Recapitulating Moscow's catalog of charges against Peking, the article assembles what seems designed as ammunition for an intensified Soviet bloc propaganda campaign to discredit the PRC leaders as warmongers and renegades from Marxism-Leninism, at the same time removing the onus for present Sino-Soviet tensions from the Soviet leadership.

Along with a spate of other anti-Chinese articles in the Soviet press, it also lays propaganda groundwork for Moscow's projected fall diplomatic offensive, which includes a Brezhnev visit to Belgrade and a Podgorny visit to Hanoi, by underscoring a portrayal of the USSR as champion of the national liberation struggle and of world peace. Released by TASS just after the four-power Berlin agreement was signed, the article juxtaposes this portrayal to attacks on the Chinese for trying to undermine the national liberation movement and harming the cause of peace.

Moscow's East European allies have given the Aleksandrov article prompt publicity. Sofia's RABOTNICHESKO DELO and Warsaw's TRYBUNA LUDU published the text, and the GDR's NEUES DEUTSCHLAND and Prague's RUDE PRAVO carried lengthy summaries. The Budapest press had not carried the article as of 7 September, but the daily MAGYAR HIRLAP published a Moscow TRUD attack on Maoist

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militarism. The Romanians, whose cordial relations with Peking have not abated in the face of such attacks, have predictably ignored the Aleksandrov blast.

Entitled "The Slogans and Deeds of the Chinese Leadership," the new Aleksandrov article's central theme is that though Peking has altered its rhetoric and its tactics, its policy remains the same and constitutes an unabated danger--a message for all who would seek cordial relations with Peking. "No matter what ultrarevolutionary phrasology was used to cover up its course," the article says, "its essence remains unchanged--the striving for hegemony in a war-devastated world . . . , even a nuclear-missile war in which, as estimated by Mao, one half of mankind could perish." Developing the theme that in reality the Chinese leaders are enemies of world peace, Aleksandrov points to Peking's opposition to collective security in Europe and Asia and its opposition to "concrete steps" toward disarmament and the prohibition of nuclear weapons.

Betraying concern over Chinese diplomatic activity in Eastern Europe, Aleksandrov adds that Peking also "stints no efforts in transferring the situation of military psychosis to Albania in the hope of sowing the seeds of tension in the Balkans by this or other methods." In another passage in the same vein, he explains that Peking is using "a differentiated approach to the socialist countries in an effort to draw some of them into the orbit of its policy." Without naming names but clearly alluding to Romania, and to a lesser degree Albania and Yugoslavia, he observes that in pursuing this policy Peking is making "alluring gestures and promises" but has "for the time being not asked much from the objects of its flirting." The implication is that in the future Peking may call in its debts. Aleksandrov goes on in effect to warn the dissidents of the possible consequences of their flirtation with Peking by pointedly recalling "the tragic fate of the Communist Party of Indonesia and some other parties whose leadership harkened to advice from Peking."

Against the background of the 30 August announcement of Podgornyy's projected visit to Hanoi in early October and President Nixon's planned trip to Peking, the article seeks to fan Hanoi's suspicions that Peking might sell it out. After noting the support and aid the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries have given the DRV, Aleksandrov comments that the members of "the anti-imperialist front of struggle cannot but be alarmed by Peking's undermining of the unity of the

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revolutionary forces and its infliction of serious damage to their common cause." In another passage developing the theme of Soviet concern for the interests of its friends and of socialism, Aleksandrov asks: "Is a deal against socialism being prepared behind the scenes in Peking and Washington, a deal at the expense of the interests of the peoples fighting for national independence and freedom?"

Turning to Peking's developing relations with the United States, Aleksandrov sustains Moscow's cautious line in noting that the Soviet Union "regards with due understanding the development of normal relations between states . . . , and the normalization of relations between the PRC and the United States is no exception." But he goes on to convey again the USSR's apprehensiveness over this development in commenting that "the Soviet people cannot help giving attention to the fact that in its overtures to Washington, the Chinese leadership again frankly stresses its hostility toward the Soviet Union."

As evidence of the anti-Soviet nature of Peking's policy toward the United States, Aleksandrov cites a recent RED FLAG article which he says sought to justify the tactics of "political double dealing" under the name of "revolutionary dual tactics." He explains that the article "corroborated the tactics of China forming blocs with any forces, including imperialist ones, for achieving Peking's foreign policy aims." But Aleksandrov obscures the thrust of the RED FLAG article--the need to identify the main enemy and to exploit contradictions within the enemy camp in order to isolate him. While Moscow's reluctance to identify the Soviet Union as China's main enemy falls into the pattern of earlier Soviet propaganda, Aleksandrov in effect admits as much in citing further evidence of the anti-Soviet nature of Peking's ~~rapprochement~~ with Washington. In giving an example of Peking's dual tactics in action, he says Chou indicated "the essence of Peking's platform and its steps aimed at rapprochement with Washington" when he took a cue from the New York TIMES' James Reston in their recent interview to comment on "the provocative thesis of a Soviet military threat to China."

As a prescription for coping with such anti-Soviet tactics and "the dangerous striving of Peking's leaders for hegemony in the world movement," Aleksandrov concludes with what amounts to a call for Soviet oriented parties to increase their attacks on Peking in remarking that communists face "the task of increasing their political vigilance, the task of further exposing the real essence of Maoist ideology and policy."

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NEW TIMES, IZVESTIYA, RED STAR DEVELOP LINES OF ATTACK

Articles in NEW TIMES, IZVESTIYA, and RED STAR have developed a number of the themes in the Aleksandrov article and resurrected some sensitive issues designed to discredit Maoism. A NEW TIMES article by Krivtsov on 3 September raises the question of the Sino-Soviet border dispute in charging that Maoist nationalism aspires to world domination. In this context Krivtsov comments: "It is characteristic that not a single state apart from China advances such great and such unfounded claims against other states and periodically creates an atmosphere of tension on the frontiers of its neighbors."

In IZVESTIYA on the 8th, Grigoriy Apalin seeks to underscore the non-Marxist-Leninist character of Chinese foreign policy in calling the PRC's concept of "two superpowers" a nonclass approach that seeks to put the United States and the USSR on the same footing and to play off one against the other. Citing Maoist doctrine on war to buttress his case, Apalin asserts that Peking would provoke a military conflict between the USSR and the United States and then "build on their ruins 'a civilization a thousand times more magnificent.'" The last public comment on this Maoist doctrine by a Soviet leader had been made by Brezhnev in his 7 June 1969 speech at the Moscow international party conference, when he recalled that Mao in 1957 "spoke with appalling airiness and cynicism of the possible destruction of half of mankind in the event of an atomic war." Maoist nuclear doctrine also came under attack in an I. Aleksandrov article in PRAVDA during a time of apparent difficulties in the Sino-Soviet border talks: A 19 March 1970 article by Aleksandrov said the Chinese press had spoken of the need for war to achieve ultimate victory and went on to lament that the Chinese "are not at all alarmed by the fact that a new world war would be a terrifying calamity for the peoples, including the Chinese, and that it would inevitably wipe out hundreds of millions of human lives."

On the subject of Peking's relations with the United States, Apalin in IZVESTIYA observes acidly that the doctrine of "two superpowers" did not prevent the Chinese leaders from deciding to develop contacts with the United States at a time when it is "intensifying its aggressive war against Indochina." Against the background of Peking's attempts to "weaken the anti-imperialist front" and its dissemination of anti-Soviet

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propaganda, Apalin concludes, "the defrosting of Sino-American relations looks like an intention on Peking's part to bring 'pressure' to bear on the Soviet Union and even to join the United States to the anti-Soviet 'front.'"

The Soviet army paper RED STAR made its contribution to "exposing" Maoism in an article by V. Vasilyev on the 7th which charges that the PLA is being used to "militarize all aspects of Chinese public life." Maintaining that Peking is using an alleged "threat from the North" as justification for its military indoctrination and war preparations, Vasilyev says "soldiers are being called upon to follow the example of those who participated in the armed provocations on the Soviet-Chinese border organized by the Mao group in 1969." Vasilyev makes no effort, however, to depict any immediate threat to the Soviet Union and notes in passing that the PLA's "war preparations have been proclaimed a long-term task." He seems to define his basic point in remarking that while the Soviet party is exposing Peking's ideological and political platform, "at the same time, as the 24th party Congress Central Committee report stated, the CPSU and the Soviet Government, maintaining restraint and not succumbing to provocations, have done and are doing everything incumbent upon the USSR to achieve a normalization of relations with the PRC." Brezhnev has personally identified himself with such a position of restraint since the Chinese border tensions in 1969.

The intensified Soviet ideological campaign against the Chinese suggests that Moscow sees little hope for a near-term improvement of its relations with Peking and that it has decided to press the attack on the Chinese as outlaws in the international community while pursuing its own rapidly evolving diplomatic moves.

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GERMANY AND BERLIN

SOVIET CENTRAL MEDIA HAIL SIGNING OF ACCORD ON "WEST BERLIN"

Markedly reticent on the 23 August announcement that the Big Four ambassadors had agreed on a draft agreement on Berlin, Soviet central media have greeted the signing of the accord on 3 September with a barrage of propaganda on the significance of what Moscow and its East European allies call the four-power agreement "on West Berlin."

The Soviet Government withheld official public endorsement until after Soviet Ambassador Abrasimov declared, in a prepared speech after the signing ceremony, that he had been instructed to state that the Soviet Government "positively evaluates" the results of the negotiations and regards the signing of the agreement as "a substantial step in the direction of strengthening peace and security in the center of Europe." Within minutes of Abrasimov's speech, TASS and Moscow radio reported the signing ceremony in detail. TASS on 3 September and PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA the next day printed the text of the agreement and annexes under the headline "Quadripartite Agreement," thereby avoiding designation of the subject matter as "Berlin." Soviet media are currently publicizing what is portrayed as almost universal favorable world reaction, including the remarks by Secretary Rogers in his 31 August Houston speech and at his 3 September press conference, along with numerous commentaries.

Soviet media's reticence in the period from the announcement of the agreement until the signing was pointed up by IZVESTIYA's failure to publish an interview given by its deputy chief editor, **Polyanov**, a specialist on European and German affairs, to Vienna television.* The interview appeared in the Austrian Communist Party organ VOLKSSTIMME on 2 September. Polyanov's listing of three main results of the "West Berlin agreement"

* Original Soviet press comment during that period was limited to a brief article, couched in generalities, in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA by TASS commentator Kornilov on 28 August and a roundup of favorable world reaction in a PRAVDA international review the next day. See the TRENDS of 1 September, pages 22-28.

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have been echoed since the signing in a PRAVDA editorial on the 4th, in an unsigned IZVESTIYA article on the 5th, and in numerous other commentaries. The agreement is said 1) to "ease" the tensions in a critical area of central Europe; 2) to remove any barrier to West German ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties with Bonn and to convening of a European security conference, and 3) to clear the way for "various settlements" between East and West Germany, including FRG recognition of the GDR and admission of both German states to the United Nations.

The propaganda repeatedly stresses that the agreement "does not touch on the sides' political and legal positions" but rather is aimed at "practical improvements" of the situation of the West Berliners while respecting GDR sovereignty. It points up Soviet "initiative" in bringing about the agreement and cites the success of the four-power talks as proof that all international problems can be solved through negotiations if all sides show good will. There is insistent stress on the point that the agreement is based on "territorial and political realities."

STRESS ON GDR-USSR UNANIMITY, RESPECT FOR GDR INTERESTS

Like East German media, Moscow has been at pains to underscore the "cooperation and consultations" between the GDR and USSR during the period of the negotiations. In an evident effort to reassure the East Germans, Abrasimov described the agreement in his speech at the signing as "a reasonable balance between mutual interests" and told East German reporters that the agreement "benefits everyone," to neither side's advantage. Moscow comment has repeatedly echoed Abrasimov's remarks, insisting that no side has scored any "gains" at the expense of any other and deploring Western speculation "about who has gained more or less."

Soviet media have reported promptly and at length a succession of East German public endorsements of the agreement calculated to present it as consistent with East German interests. GDR media have followed up a text of the "German translation" of the agreement with almost daily editorials and statements by East German leaders, including interviews with Ulbricht and Stoph as well as Honecker. Emphasis is on the "West Berlin agreement" as constituting recognition of GDR sovereignty by

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the West, a point made over and over again by Honecker in an interview carried by ADN on the 4th and published in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND the next day. It is also said to encompass Western recognition of the "integrity of Berlin" as the capital of the GDR and to confirm the GDR position that West Berlin has a "special political status"--points included in Moscow's publicity for the East German statements but not made directly in the USSR's own comment.

Moscow and East Berlin have both noted that concessions and "accommodations" made the agreement possible, Honecker stating defensively on 4 September that there are two criteria for judging whether the GDR's "accommodation was right and useful": An accommodation must serve "detente and the consolidation of peace in Europe" and must also take cognizance of "the sovereign rights and interests of the GDR." He asserted that the agreement measured up on both counts. Without defining what "the GDR accommodation" was, he went on to say that "West Berliners will appreciate the fact that the transit traffic across GDR territory has been put on an agreed basis and that its procedures will be facilitated, for example by the sealing of trains and through-buses." At this point Honecker added caustically: "We have no objection to one seal more or less." He also noted that West Berliners will be able to visit the GDR, "including its capital," once the West Berlin Senat-GDR talks are concluded.

POLEMIC WITH THE CHINESE A Moscow broadcast in Mandarin on 7 September anticipated a charge from Peking that the USSR has sold out GDR interests in the four-power agreement. Pointing to extensive Soviet consultations with the GDR during the negotiations and to Honecker's strong endorsement of the agreement, the broadcast complained that Peking propaganda "has always chimed in with" the "imperialists" in attacking Soviet foreign policy, among other things going "all-out" to attack the USSR for signing a treaty with the FRG and trying to "sow seeds of dissension between the Soviet Union and the GDR."

The charge that the PRC opposes "the attainment of collective security in Europe" and is against the Soviet and Polish treaties with the FRG appears in the authoritative I. Aleksandrov article in the 3 September PRAVDA--publicized by TASS just three hours after the Berlin agreement was signed--which in effect sets guidelines for an intensified Soviet bloc assault on the Chinese.

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Peking's first mention of the agreement came on 9 September in an NCNA report denouncing "anti-China propaganda" being disseminated by TASS. "To have a treaty ratified by West Germany and to obtain economic and technical aid from it," NCNA said, the Soviet "revisionist clique" has "of late in an agreement on West Berlin liberally given away what belongs to others, unscrupulously selling out the German Democratic Republic." Peking media had ignored the four-power negotiations, but Tirana has been vocal in airing charges of a Soviet sellout of the GDR. Albanian comment now says the agreement "brutally violates the sovereign rights of the GDR" and charges that the USSR has in effect abrogated its 1955 treaty with the GDR giving the latter control over civilian movement between West Berlin and the Federal Republic.

MOSCOW: NO REASON NOW TO DELAY EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE

The very limited Soviet comment on the Berlin agreement during the period after the 23 August announcement had refrained from pressing the notion that the West could now cite no reason to delay the convening of a European security conference--a theme stressed, however, in substantial East European comment, consistent with Moscow's own long-standing rejection of the NATO position that such a conference could not be held until a Berlin settlement had been reached. In its considerable propaganda since the signing, Moscow has now picked up the theme, keynoted in PRAVDA's editorial observation on the 4th, that "realistically thinking Western politicians" have noted that the agreement removes an obstacle in the path of reducing tension in Europe, putting "in a difficult position" the opponents of ratification of Bonn's treaties with Moscow and Warsaw and of the convening of a conference on European security. Articles in PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, and RED STAR the next day--all drawing on foreign reaction to the Berlin accord--note that opponents of a security conference have lost a decisive round in their campaign to block the conference.

Some of Moscow's comment has gone on to say that the Berlin accord may also be instrumental in getting talks on force and arms reductions in Central Europe off the ground. Participants in the 5 September domestic service commentators' roundtable, observing that opponents of a European security conference "have now had their guns spiked" by the four-power accord, imputed to Western diplomats the view that the agreement

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"improves the atmosphere for an approach to the problem of reducing armed forces and armaments" in Europe. The USSR is willing to begin negotiations on this problem at any time, one panelist said, recalling that such talks had been proposed in the foreign policy program set forth at the 24th CPSU Congress.

The TASS account of Secretary Rogers' 3 September press conference reported that he called the signing of the agreement "a first step to be followed by other efforts directed at cooperation in Europe." TASS then said that Rogers, in response to a question, indicated that Washington "has not yet finally worked out its position in respect to possible talks on the question of a reduction of armed forces in Europe and the convocation of the all-European conference." The account reported Rogers as saying that Washington is prepared to discuss both issues but has not decided whether the talks should be held simultaneously or separately.

WARSAW: ACCORD IS ANOTHER RECOGNITION OF POSTWAR STATUS QUO

Warsaw comment has continued to discuss the four-power agreement in the context of Poland's interest in achieving confirmation of the postwar political map of Europe. It has emphasized the point that the Western powers, by signing the agreement, have granted the GDR de facto recognition. In passages betraying Polish fears of a reunited Germany, a TRYBUNA LUDU article on 4 September stated that by entering into negotiations with East Berlin under the umbrella of the Big Four agreement, Bonn has accepted the permanent division of the area of the Third Reich into two German states plus a "separate territory" of West Berlin "which is not a part of the FRG and cannot be ruled by the Bonn government."

PAP commentator Guz said on the 4th that the Soviet "presence" in West Berlin has been strengthened and that the USSR and the Western Big Three are "responsible for the further evolution" of West Berlin. The TRYBUNA LUDU article of the 4th, noting that the USSR will have a consulate general in West Berlin under the "West Berlin agreement" which it has signed, observes that this deals a "considerable blow" to the West Berlin "cold war politicians" who would like to extend FRG authority to West Berlin and even to "the GDR capital."

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Using the occasion of a fall harvest festival in Opole, in the old German Silesia taken over by Poland after World War II, Premier Jaroszewicz indirectly brought up the theme of confirmation of Poland's present borders in praising the inhabitants' struggle "for their Polish character, for their unity with the hinterland, and for social freedom and progress." In the speech broadcast live by the Warsaw radio, the Polish premier said his government "welcomes" the four-power agreement "with satisfaction and gives it full support," deeming it "another important element" fostering European peace, based on recognition by all states of postwar "political and territorial realities." Like Warsaw comment generally, he called for early FRG ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties.

PRAGUE: ATMOSPHERE IS "MORE CONDUCTIVE" TO TALKS WITH BONN

In comment immediately following the 23 August announcement on the four-power agreement, Prague media referred obliquely to enhanced prospects for resumption of the Bonn-Prague exploratory talks on normalizing relations. On 8 September, the day after Chancellor Brandt told a group of high school editors the talks would resume, RUDE PRAVO said the Berlin agreement had "created an atmosphere more conducive to talks on the normalization of relations between Czechoslovakia and the Federal Republic." And on the 9th RUDE PRAVO announced that the talks would resume in Prague at the end of September.* A statement by an FRG Foreign Ministry spokesman on 27 July to the effect that the talks would probably resume in September had been ignored in Czechoslovak media.

In limited comment on the talks since the second meeting between FRG State Secretary Frank and Deputy Foreign Minister Klusak on 13-14 May, Czechoslovak media had continued to stress the necessity for Bonn "to recognize the invalidity of the Munich diktat ab initio." In a 31 July commentary, apparently indirectly responsive to the FRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement of 27 July, RUDE PRAVO reiterated the stand that Bonn must take "a principled position on the

* DPA on 7 September quoted an "informed source" as saying they would be held on 27 and 28 September.

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nonvalidity of the Munich agreement ab initio with all consequences arising therefrom." This statement has recurred in almost every official Czechoslovak foreign policy statement over the past several months and was incorporated in the communique of the 2 August Soviet bloc summit meeting in the Crimea, though without the final phrase on the "consequences arising therefrom."

In early comment on the draft Berlin agreement, RUDE PRAVO and the Slovak trade union daily PRACA both saw enhanced hope that the vestiges of the Munich "diktat" could now be erased. A RUDE PRAVO article on 4 September, in reiterating the Czechoslovak stand, followed the lead of the Crimea communique in dropping the phrase on "consequences arising therefrom." On the 8th, in discerning an improved atmosphere for the Prague-Bonn talks on normalizing relations, RUDE PRAVO did not mention the Munich agreement at all; it stated only that the situation created by the Berlin agreement is "better" because the position of "reactionary West German circles," including the Sudeten German Landsmannschaften, has been "considerably eroded."

On the 9th, in the article announcing that the talks would resume, RUDE PRAVO said "it can only be hoped" that the new round in Prague "will open the road to an agreement which would correspond to the real 'conciliation between the FRG and all socialist states' which is now being talked about in Bonn." Referring to Chancellor Brandt's projected trip to the USSR, the article saw the trip as a continuation of East-West contacts and added that although Bonn has not yet ratified the Moscow treaty, the Chancellor's visit "might be useful not only for a further improvement of relations between the USSR and the FRG but for all European nations."

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DISARMAMENT

GROMYKO LETTER TO U THANT RESURRECTS CALL FOR WORLD CONFERENCE

TASS on 8 September released the text of Foreign Minister Gromyko's letter of the 6th to U Thant requesting that the issue of a world disarmament conference be placed on the agenda of the General Assembly, which opens on 21 September. The proposal represents the third agenda item suggested by the USSR: Gromyko in a letter of 4 June to U Thant had asked that the UNGA consider the USSR's draft treaty governing man's activities on the moon, and in a 13 July letter Gromyko called for debate on the implementation of the declaration on strengthening international security, a declaration approved by the UNGA last year.

The renewal of the call for a world disarmament conference coincides with a stepped-up Moscow attack on China as a threat to world peace and follows by a month Peking's 30 July rejection of a June proposal by the USSR for a conference of the five nuclear powers to discuss nuclear disarmament. In rejecting the proposal, the Chinese repeated the long-standing PRC proposal for a summit conference of all countries of the world to discuss the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and, as a first step, to reach an agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons. The latest Soviet proposal serves also to enhance the image of the USSR as a prime mover in the struggle for detente.

In his 6 September letter Gromyko routinely hails previous agreements restricting the arms race and notes that talks are currently under way to resolve specific issues--presumably a reference to the 26-nation Geneva disarmament talks and the U.S.-Soviet talks on strategic arms limitation. But he observes that "no cardinal shift" has yet taken place in the direction of curbing the arms race, and says this is a cause of concern to the Soviet Union and to the peoples of the world. Gromyko recalls that the USSR in its continuing effort to brake the arms race has proposed a conference of the five nuclear powers,* and now suggests

* The letter does not go on to note that the Chinese rejected the USSR's proposal, although this rejection continues to be deplored in other propaganda. Most recently, the authoritative 4 September PRAVDA article by I. Aleksandrov charged that the PRC has come out against steps aimed at disarmament, citing the rejection of the five-power conference proposal.

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the convocation of a world disarmament conference which would discuss both conventional and nuclear disarmament, with stress on the latter. Observing that "all countries" should be represented at this forum, Gromyko concludes that the participation of "all states possessing considerable armed forces and arms" is of "special importance."

BACKGROUND The proposal for a world disarmament conference was surfaced at the October 1964 Cairo conference of nonaligned states. It was subsequently endorsed by Gromyko in his December 1964 UNGA speech and was hailed with regularity in Soviet propaganda through the end of 1965, when the General Assembly unanimously approved it. The question remained largely quiescent since then until Brezhnev--in his 30 March 1971 report to the 24th CPSU party congress--suggested convening both a conference of the five nuclear powers and a worldwide conference "to examine every aspect of the disarmament question." Propaganda since March has routinely endorsed the proposal for a world conference, in most instances merely citing it as one of the elements in the USSR's "peace program."

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MIDDLE EAST

MOSCOW SAYS EXCLUSION OF COMMUNISTS WEAKENS ARAB UNITY

Moscow has given only lukewarm welcome to the Federation of Arab Republics (FAR) following the 1 September referendums in the member countries--Egypt,* Syria, and Libya. Past unity experiments have generally been regarded with qualified approval; the establishment of the FAR, announced in Benghazi last April, was received "with satisfaction" by Moscow, which abstained at that time from any reflections on the difficulties to be encountered. The preceding November, a Soviet propagandist had observed, in connection with the announcement of a union of the Tripoli Charter states--Egypt, Sudan, Libya, and later Syria--that strengthening of the alliance presented "no few practical problems."**

Now Moscow offers a critical and detailed assessment of the "extremely complex" problems facing Arab unity in a NEW TIMES article by R. Petrov, the text of which was broadcast in installments to Arab audiences on the eve of the referendum. Petrov's strictures against the exclusion of Arab communists from the "common struggle" reflect Soviet concern following the communist reverses in Sudan, Libya's stern rejection of communism, and, presumably, the May ouster and current trial of former Nasir associates in Egypt. But the admonition against anticommunism in the context of unity moves is not unique to the present situation, for veiled warnings along these lines appeared in propaganda at the time of the April 1963 Egyptian-Syrian-Iraqi unity statement. Petrov additionally implies disapproval of Egypt's acceptance of U.S. efforts to assist in a Middle East settlement. He derides the idea voiced "even at top levels" in some Arab countries of seeking support from the West as well as the East, regarding the United States

* Following the referendum Egypt's name was officially changed, on 2 September, from the United Arab Republic to the Arab Republic of Egypt.

** For discussions of Soviet comment on earlier unity moves, see the 21 April 1971 TRENDS, pp. 20-22, and the 2 May 1963 FBIS SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS, pp. 7-10.

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as "allegedly holding the 'key'" to a settlement, and trying to "neutralize" the U.S. role--a concept identified with AL-AHRAM chief editor Haykal.

Meager and restrained comment since the referendum routinely stresses the importance of unity on an anti-imperialist basis, as supported by "all Arab patriots and democrats," and cites unidentified Arab papers as pointing to the vital necessity for the FAR to strengthen its friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. PRAVDA on the 3d claims that the FAR members, "just as before," do not reject a political settlement of the Middle East crisis--a point also made in comment on the unity actions in April and last November.

NEW TIMES The Petrov article in NEW TIMES (No. 35, 27 August)
ARTICLE analyzes the disparities in Arab societies--
 economic and social systems, ethnic and religious
features, political structures--complicating the Arabs' "half-
century-old aspiration" for unity. Petrov allows that earlier
unity attempts were "by and large undertaken on an anti-
imperialist basis," but says "this was not enough."

Petrov approvingly explains the Arab communists' "scientific approach to unity" involving struggle against imperialism and Israeli aggression, democratization of sociopolitical life in the interests of the working people, participation of all progressive national groups, and support of the socialist community and other revolutionary forces. At the same time, he rejects the narrow "nationalism and traditional conservative views" by which imperialism, Zionism, and Arab reactionaries, he says, seek to impede the Arab unity movement. And he assails "reactionary and rightwing forces" in the Arab countries for trying to persuade people that it is possible to draw on the support of the socialist countries "and at the same time wipe out the local Arab communists and ban the communist parties." Petrov says that experience--"the Arabs' included"--has shown that imperialism can be successfully combated only if all national progressive forces stand united; "any attempt to exclude the communists and their parties from the common struggle can only weaken the united front."

Politburo member Kirilenko delivered a similar admonition in a 19 August speech in Minsk. In the first elite reference to the events in Sudan since the 2 August Crimea statement of Soviet and East European leaders, Kirilenko said that at times

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undesirable and "even dangerous situations" may occur in the development of certain countries belonging to the "national liberation zone," and he referred to the Sudanese developments as causing "grave alarm and condemnation." Kirilenko went on to say that the CPSU facilitates the cohesion of national patriotic forces, "of which communists are a steadfast and courageous detachment," and he added that "only this united alliance" can achieve solutions of the difficult tasks facing the liberated countries. A Korionov article in the 27 August PRAVDA obliquely made the same point in stating that the socialist countries and the communist parties "consistently oppose actions which can undermine the unity" of people fighting against imperialism, for national independence and social progress.

COMMENT FROM EAST EUROPE East European media are also appraising the new federation in light of recent developments in the Arab world and cautioning against anti-communist trends. Unlike NEW TIMES, Prague's RUDE PRAVO explicitly discusses the FAR in the context of the arrests in Egypt, events in Morocco, anticommunist "massacres" in Sudan, and Jordanian actions against the fedayeen. While Arab national and progressive forces basically welcome the new federation as a positive step, RUDE PRAVO says on 1 September, "there should be no room for anticommunism" in the new federation. Objecting, as does NEW TIMES, to a purely "national" basis for Arab unity, the paper believes that the Arabs are now striving for unity not only in national but also in social terms: The federation's success will depend on its economic, social, and political lines, it says. Predicting that the new federation will strengthen its ties with the Soviet Union, RUDE PRAVO recalls that AL-AHRAM chief editor Haykal--in his weekly article on 27 August--put this as the federation's first task.

A Budapest radio commentary in English on the 27th also publicizes Haykal's views, commenting that his article seems to be addressed not only to the Western press but also to certain Arab leaders. The commentary goes on to recall "open anticommunist tendencies" in recent Arab developments, citing the "virtual liquidation" of the Sudanese CP and of the guerrillas in Jordan, and adding that there have been indications that the political balance established by Nasir in Egypt "has been upset to a certain extent." An article in the Hungarian party organ NEPSZABADSAG the following day, discussing socialist countries' relations with states of varying political systems and conditions,

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expresses "resolute opposition" to any anticommunist witch hunt and full solidarity with the Sudanese CP. In the belief that driving back the imperialist "aggressors" and restoring peace in the Middle East is the most important issue in the region, the socialist countries, the article says, patiently try to convince noncommunist fighters against imperialism of the primary need for cohesion.

In Warsaw, TRYBUNA LUDU on 27 August also discusses the increased "backward, anticommunist trends" in some Arab countries which have "gone through rather profound national liberation processes." Like NEW TIMES, the paper touches on constitutional, political, economic, and cultural differences among the Arab states as well as increased rivalry for leadership of the Arab world. The paper identifies the masses and the leftwing parties led by the communists as the "most consistent force" of the Arab liberation movement, noting that in the countries where these elements are strong, acute struggles and repression of the left occur. TRYBUNA LUDU observes that friction and struggle even take place within the governing middle classes, which are "not homogenous politically," and it cites the Ba'thist struggle in Syria last fall and "political differences" in the Egyptian ASU leading to the arrest of 'Ali Sabri and others. The paper warns that Washington and Tel Aviv are seeking to intensify inter-Arab contradictions and give more power to the Arab right wing, which is ready to make concessions to Washington and lessen cooperation with the socialist states. "Realistic" Arab politicians, it adds, are cautioning against this.

ARAB CP'S The Lebanese communist daily AN-NIDA on 31 August
ON UNITY carried a Syrian CP communique supporting Arab unity
 and the FAR and calling for a "yes" vote in the
Syrian referendum. But on 2 September an AN-NIDA editorial
criticized "recent developments" in the FAR states and said the
federation could not play its proper role unless it was firmly
anti-imperialist and supported the "unity of the Arab progressive
forces." It accused Egypt--by implication--of "concessions and
bargaining" in response to U.S.-Israeli "maneuvers," and of
alliance with Arab reaction represented by Saudi Arabia. And
it denounced the anticommunist campaign in Sudan which "spread
to other Arab countries," complaining that while certain attempts
were made in federation states to prevent aggravation of these
developments, firm attitudes were not adopted, and the Libyan
rulers were even trying to fan enmity toward communism and
"true socialist ideas."

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'NEW TIMES' APPRAISES RECONSTITUTED ARAB SOCIALIST UNION

An article by Lykov in NEW TIMES (No. 34, 20 August) on the reconstruction of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) seems to suggest that Moscow is, on the surface at least, resigned to the new order in Cairo following the May purge of top officials and the reconstitution of the ASU and other governmental and public bodies. In what is apparently the first Soviet propaganda explanation of the Egyptian upheaval, Lykov assesses the May political crisis as one of the ASU itself, caused, among other things, by "inner contradictions" and inadequate forms of public life in relation to the level of the country's socio-economic development. He notes without elaboration that the May events resulted from the existence of "so-called 'centers of influence,' that is, from manifestations of factionalism." (Moscow in May had merely cited as-Sadat as saying, in explanation of the leadership changes, that the resignations of certain governmental and ASU officials were due to their opposition to the establishment of the FAR. Soviet media did note that the officials who had resigned were placed under arrest.)

Lykov finds fault with the old ASU, even if it did represent a "big step along the road of progressive development on new lines," and he ticks off various weaknesses which prevented it from becoming a real directing force in Egyptian society. He notes that, "as has now become known," there even existed within the ASU a "secret organization, the socialist vanguard"--a grouping Moscow has been advocating for some years.* He later observes that the new ASU program envisages formation of a vanguard organization within the ASU, this time a "legal organization."

He approvingly views the reconstitution of the ASU as an attempt to create an effective, "not just formally existing, political organization." Calling the July session of the ASU National Congress "an event of signal importance" in the country's history, he points out that the congress for the first time adopted a program for the country's reconstruction. In Moscow's first praise for this document, Lykov ranks it in importance with "the other fundamental documents" of the UAR--the 1962 National Action Charter, and the 30 March 1968 program. (As in propaganda since Nasir's death, Moscow material on the July ASU Congress--including

* See the 18 November 1970 TRENDS, pages 10-13.

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CPSU CC Secretary Ponomarev's speech at the session--underscored the importance of the 1962 and 1968 documents as the "main programs" for the UAR, and glossed over the new national action program presented by as-Sadat.)

Lykov does nevertheless foresee difficulties, since the ASU is still young as a political organization and "its new functionaries are younger still" in organizational political experience. Lykov also pointedly notes that local reactionaries try to promote the idea that people of Marxist persuasion must not be allowed to share in active political life.

TRIAL OF 'ALI SABRI In line with its cautious propaganda approach to the changes in Egypt, Moscow has given virtually no attention to the status of the former officials ousted in May. TASS on 25 August carried the first--and thus far only--report on the trial of 'Ali Sabri and others, which opened that day, noting that the indictment accused the defendants of participating in a plot against the "existing regime." The report mentioned that the defendants pleaded not guilty, and added that at the request of the defense the case was postponed to 4 September.

The French CP, in an appeal to President as-Sadat reported in L'HUMANITE on 6 September, cited the anticommunist repression in Sudan, the trial in Marrakesh, Morocco, and the call for nine death sentences in the "secret trial in Cairo," declaring that the PCF could not remain indifferent to this series of blows "directed against communists, democrats, and Arab patriots." The appeal added that political differences among anti-imperialist fighters "must not be resolved by judicial and repressive methods," and asked as-Sadat not to convict these men who "have participated with great distinction in the Egyptian people's struggles for freedom, dignity, and progress."

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POLAND

PLENUM GUIDELINES FOR PARTY CONGRESS CHART BALANCED COURSE

With the memory of the December riots still fresh, the Polish leadership's continued concern about its acceptance by the rank-and-file workers is strongly in evidence in the materials of the 11th plenum of the Polish United Workers Party (PZPR) held on 4 September. The plenum adopted a decision to convene the Sixth Congress of the PZPR on 6 December--"nearly one year before the date envisioned by the statute," as noted by First Secretary Gierek in his plenum speech. The brief three-year interval since the fifth congress in November 1968 is unprecedented in the modern history of the East European ruling parties; it has been paralleled only in the rapid succession of Soviet party congresses in 1956, 1959, and 1961.

The 11th plenum adopted "guidelines" for the congress in a document that balances pledges of liberal practices with assertions of orthodoxy in the critical sphere of Poland's position in the Soviet bloc. Entitled "For the Further Socialist Development of the Polish People's Republic," it was summarized at length by PAP in English on the 6th and, according to TRYBUNA LUDU, put on sale to the public in pamphlet form by the "Ruch" press circulation enterprise the same day.

While TASS in English on the 7th referred to the document as "directives" for the congress in reporting its adoption by the plenum, Gierek underscored the designation "guidelines"--used consistently in PAP's English-language summary of the document--and emphasized that the document is not "final" but is merely to serve as the basis for pregress "discussion" by the workers.

GIEREK SPEECH In his relatively brief plenum speech, as read by an announcer in the Warsaw domestic service on 4 September, Gierek said at the outset that "the reasons for the earlier convening of the congress were stated at the eighth Central Committee plenum" in February. At that meeting, he had wound up a lengthy discussion of the problems and tasks facing the party with the remark that "the great importance of the tasks before us in further developing socialist construction in Poland makes it imperative to

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examine the question of an earlier convening of the sixth party congress." Now Gierek recalled the "tragic" December events, claiming that "we mustered enough strength and ideological fortitude to lead our country out of the dangerous situation." He noted that the seventh plenum (20 December) and eighth plenum (6-7 February) had "corrected the party policy" and "made the essential personnel changes"--most notably Gomulka's removal from the Politburo and "suspension" from the Central Committee.

The main pitch of Gierek's 4 September speech was to underscore the "democratic" character of the congress document, leaving it to the document itself to develop the orthodox message--stress on the party's leading role and on Poland's alliance with the Soviet Union, CEMA, and the Warsaw Pact. He paid brief tribute to the CPSU's experience as the "inspiration" for the guidelines and remarked that the congress would "also provide the forum for the international communist and workers movement, whose representatives we shall invite to our congress."

Pointing up a departure from the usual communist practice, Gierek noted the absence of a full report by the Politburo to the plenum and explained that it was "unnecessary" since the draft guidelines constituted "a correct and adequate basis for our deliberations and resolutions." The PZPR leader underscored the inadequacy of orthodox communist practices to deal with the current Polish situation in stressing the use of the term "guidelines," stating that "we have chosen not to use the traditional form of pregress theses," which usually contain "a detailed and final" draft of the upcoming five-year plan. Such a draft, he added, has "very often been quite difficult for the party and the public to understand, being more in the nature of information about what was going to be done than something encouraging people to think, discuss, and act." Further emphasizing the "open character" of the guidelines, he envisioned discussion of the document by the rank and file as "the basic property of socialist democracy, which does not divide society into those in power and those ruled."

Gierek added a word of caution about the standard routine of workers' "pledges" in honor of the upcoming party congress: Party organizations, he said, must see that such pledges are "of the 'from below' and voluntary character and most resolutely forestall formalism and striving for effect."

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CONGRESS The congress guidelines, as summarized by IAP on
DOCUMENT the 6th, stress a determination to develop socialist
 democracy, to "modernize" and achieve more
"flexibility" in planning and management, and to improve the lot
of the worker. In the process the document aims new barbs at
the Gomulka regime, citing such "negative phenomena" of the
1966-70 plan period as insufficient production of consumer goods
and lack of development in housing construction.

The guidelines' liberal features are balanced by hardlining,
orthodox pronouncements which convey the assurance that the
liberalized practices do not portend a deviation of the
Czechoslovak or Romanian variety. Thus, in stressing the "key"
role of the USSR and the results of the 24th CPSU Congress,
the PZPR document declares: "We will oppose any centrifugal
tendencies within the socialist camp and the international
working class movement--tendencies which, proceeding from the
positions of rightist or leftist revisionism, turn against the
socialist community under a common nationalist denominator."

In the same vein, the guidelines call for "vigilance," warning
that the "class struggle" within the country is by no means
over and that the "enemies of socialism" are still operating
under the cloak of socialist slogans. In the realm of
culture, they call in the same breath for "overcoming limita-
tions that constrain cultural life" and for "fighting
tendencies hostile to socialism." And they state that the
mass information media--the chief culprit, in orthodox eyes,
in the Czechoslovak episode--should both "reveal negative
phenomena" and "win social support for the party's policy"
and "strengthen socialist consciousness and discipline."

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K O R E A

PYONGYANG SAYS PAK TRIES TO "SCUTTLE" NORTH-SOUTH CONTACTS

While publicizing the continuing contacts between the North and South Korean Red Cross organizations and calling attention to other efforts to institute North-South contacts, Pyongyang has resumed sharp attacks on the ROK after a period of relative restraint. In an apparent effort to prepare the ground for putting the blame on Seoul should the talks fail to satisfy the growing demand for progress in this area, Pyongyang since 28 August has mounted vitriolic attacks on the "Pak Chong-hui puppet clique" for planning to "scuttle" the Red Cross contacts. These contacts, dealing with the problem of families separated by the division of the country, were continued on 26 and 30 August and on 3 September. The two Red Cross organizations have agreed to hold preliminary discussions in Panmunjom on 20 September, preceded by an exchange of namelists of the respective delegations on the 16th.*

The charges that the Pak "clique" plans to obstruct the Red Cross talks came after a period of restraint in Pyongyang's treatment of the ROK Government following the initial 14 August agreement to begin the Red Cross contacts. The period immediately following the agreement was not wholly devoid of criticisms of President Pak, however, and the current attacks were foreshadowed in a 17 August KCNA commentary on Pak's National Day speech two days earlier. Coming before the first Red Cross meeting on the 20th, the commentary claimed that Pak had "cunningly worked to foil" the contacts, even instigating his prime minister to warn against pinning much hope on a dialog.

The current attacks, beginning with statements by spokesmen of various North Korean public organizations carried by KCNA from 28 to 30 August, similarly score the Southern "traitors" for warning against placing too much hope in the contacts and

* See the TRENDS of 18 August, pages 27-32, and of 25 August, pages 40-42, for discussion of the agreement to institute Red Cross contacts and of the first meeting at Panmunjom on 20 August.

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thus showing their true colors as foes of Korean reunification. The most authoritative comment thus far has been a NODONG SINMUN editorial article on 5 September attacking President Pak's budget message, read by Prime Minister Kim Chong-pil to the National Assembly on 2 September. NODONG SINMUN says Pak revealed himself to be a foe of reunification by speaking of UN responsibility for unification and endorsing the continued existence of UNCURK and by warning of the threat of an invasion from the North at a time when North-South contacts were taking place. Other statements by the ROK prime minister have also come under attack. A 1 September KCNA report construed a statement by the prime minister on 29 August, warning the South Korean people against over-optimism about the outcome of the talks, as showing that he is trying to frustrate the talks. He was similarly attacked in a 7 September KCNA commentary on a press conference he gave on the 4th.

OTHER PROPOSALS While the Red Cross contacts continue, Pyongyang has publicized other DPRK efforts to institute North-South contacts. A Pyongyang domestic radio report of the 1 September meeting of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) noted that the North Korean representative once again demanded that the "enemy side" implement the seven-point demand made at preceding meetings. The brief report did not, however, recall the content of the proposal--presented at the 29 July MAC meeting and repeated at the meeting on 25 August--which included a demand that the United States stop preventing civilian travel across the military demarcation line.

The activities of the DPRK-sponsored General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (GAKRJ) continue to be publicized, KCNA on 30 August reporting a letter from the organization to its ROK-sponsored counterpart repeating a proposal for meetings of Koreans in Japan to support the Red Cross talks. It expressed regret that the first letter in which it advanced the proposal--reported by KCNA on the 19th--had received no reply.

On 6 September KCNA reported a letter to the DPRK Committee for the Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland from the chairman of a committee of overseas Koreans in Canada supporting the convening of a conference of overseas Koreans to discuss reunification. The DPRK Committee had agreed to

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such a conference in an 11 August letter to Ko Pyong-chol, president of the United Front for Korean Democracy in New York. The GAKRJ had offered to send representatives to such a conference in a statement carried by KCNA on 18 August.

Kim Il-song's 6 August offer to contact all political parties in South Korea, specifically including the ruling Democratic Republican Party, received further publicity in a 6 September KCNA report of statements attributed to various overseas Koreans praising Kim's offer.

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CHINA AND DPRK

PRC SIGNS MILITARY AID AGREEMENT WITH NORTH KOREA

Peking's show of support for the DPRK--reciprocated by Pyongyang's endorsement of its ally's invitation to President Nixon--was again in evidence with the signing on 7 September of an agreement providing "military aid gratis" to the North Koreans. Neither Peking nor Pyongyang has disclosed the nature of the aid, but the high-level North Korean military delegation which negotiated the agreement included KPA Chief of Staff O Chin-u and the air force, artillery, and naval commanders. Arriving in Peking on 18 August, the delegation was hosted by PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng and had talks with Chou En-lai during its three-week stay.

The military aid agreement follows up a Sino-Korean "economic cooperation" accord signed on 15 August during the visit of a DPRK economic delegation led by Vice Premier Chong Chun-taek. That an agreement on military aid was to follow was hinted by Li Hsien-nien at a 16 August banquet for the Korean economic delegation when he observed that the Chinese and Korean people have always cooperated with each other in the cause of "strengthening the national defense capabilities," adding that the Chinese people regard the Koreans' achievements in national defense "as their own and are very happy about it."

There had been no mention of military aid in connection with the last previous aid agreement, signed in October 1970, though the presence of Huang Yung-sheng and a PLA deputy chief of staff at the signing ceremony suggested that military aid may have been involved. O Chi-u previously led a Korean military delegation for "a friendly visit" to the PRC in mid-1970, taking part in the PLA anniversary celebrations during the visit. There was no report of a military aid agreement at that time.

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PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

KANSU COLLEGES REOPEN; RED FLAG DISCUSSES EDUCATION REFORM

The six principal institutions of higher education in Kansu province have completed enrollment of new students for the coming school year, according to a Lanchow broadcast of 4 September. The radio specifies that this is the first such enrollment since the cultural revolution. Thus it appears that colleges in the more remote areas of China are to reopen this fall, following last year's resumption in the major cities of the East.

Qualifications for enrollees are apparently unchanged from last year. The major target, according to the Lanchow radio, will be workers, peasants and PLA members with several years of practical experience and an educational level above junior middle school, although "young intellectuals" with two to three years experience in productive labor will also be admitted.

In other respects, however, there will be some further softening this fall of the cultural revolution guidelines on higher education, judging by an article in RED FLAG No. 10 reviewing the experience of last year at Tsinghua University in Peking. Broadcast by Radio Peking on 3 September, the article was written by the model worker-PLA propaganda team which entered Tsinghua University to curb recalcitrant students and reform the educational system on 27 July 1968--an event later blessed by Mao himself with a gift of mangoes sent to the team. In an unusual reference, the authors laud the working class for "smashing the criminal plot of the counterrevolutionary 16 May scheming clique." References in official media to the ultraleftist "16 May group"--an issue in central leadership disputes surrounding the missing Chen Po-ta--are extremely rare, and particularly so in the context of educational reform.

The article reflects a generally moderate educational line, and its public condemnation of the radical group at this time is probably aimed at forestalling any continuing insistence on a rigid interpretation of cultural revolutionary higher educational reforms. Previous educational guidelines, such as those contained in RED FLAG No. 6, released last June as a special issue on education, tempered radical demands for

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educational reform but did not specifically mention the "16 May" group. "Sham Marxist political swindlers" who support "idealist apriorism" and have slowed rebuilding of the educational apparatus were condemned at that time, however.

ABILITY The current RED FLAG article addresses itself
GROUPINGS directly to the practical problem of how to teach
 effectively when poorly prepared worker-students
are placed in classes with students at a higher educational level,
an issue also discussed in other recent articles. The article
explains that soon after the worker-students entered Tsinghua,
this problem became "very conspicuous in a certain specialty
course" and had a negative effect on teaching, studying and
"relations between the teachers and the students." When
teachers asked the authorities within the university "if they
could treat the students differently and give supplementary
lessons on basic theoretical knowledge to those students who
had a poorer educational background," some members of the
propaganda team incorrectly concluded that this was a
reflection of the "revisionist theory of education of the
talented" and ignored the suggestion. Only after the
problem "became more and more conspicuous and a few teachers
reiterated their viewpoint" did the leaders recognize the
need to give supplementary lessons to those students with
lower educational levels in order to give them the basic
knowledge necessary "to study and manage the university
well." Emphasizing the lesson to be learned, the article
unequivocally declares that teaching should be carried out
"with different lessons and requirements for different
students in accordance with their actual levels, and a
number of students should be given supplementary lessons
on basic theories."

ROLE FOR While the leading role of workers and peasants
INTELLECTUALS in educational work is routinely reaffirmed in
 the RED FLAG article, the formation of alliances
with intellectuals is strongly argued as a means to insure
progress in educational reform. The teams are cautioned not
to "pretend to understand everything and make hasty decisions
on important issues which they do not have the confidence to
handle." Leading cadres must acknowledge that most intellectuals
want to make ideological progress and that only a "very limited
number of intellectuals take a hostile attitude toward our
country." The "leftist" evaluation of intellectuals--"all
intellectuals serve the interest of the bourgeoisie" and
"cannot be trusted politically"--must be avoided.

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The "rightist" tendency to view the ideological transformation of intellectuals as almost completed is, however, also not in agreement with "objective realities," the Tsinghua team declares. Leading cadres are instructed to be fully aware that intellectuals "will experience ideological vacillations and reversals in the course of their ideological remolding," and "if we fail to recognize this, we will tend to demand too much of others and reduce our own tasks." Those cadres who "cannot dialectically handle the ideological reversals of the intellectuals, and tend to detest them," were firmly urged to recognize the positive qualities intellectuals possess.

Sharp limitations to the concept of student-power--at its zenith during the Red Guard phase of the cultural revolution--are outlined in the article. Students who criticize teachers "whenever they feel dissatisfied with them" are castigated for "elevating minor problems to the level of principle" and for making "teachers feel under great pressure and reducing their revolutionary enthusiasm." At Tsinghua, at least, this attitude has been corrected and the students there now understand "that mistakes are unavoidable in lectures." When a teacher makes a mistake in his lecture today "it is not a serious matter," merely "something for the entire class to discuss, study and correct."

The article also criticizes leading cadres who accept criticism "by workers but not by intellectuals." Cadres guilty of this shortcoming are instructed "not to turn a deaf ear to the correct opinions expressed by some people just because they made mistakes in the past." Leaders who fail to distinguish between "studying for the sake of revolution" and "putting professional work in command" are rebuked for their responsibility in creating the present situation in which "teachers are failing to study and are afraid to engage in professional research."

AUTHORITY OF CCP COMMITTEES

A dominant theme of recent articles on higher education has been the need to recognize the authority of the revived party committees over the entire educational apparatus. Mao's August 1968 injunction that the workers must control the schools is now interpreted specifically to mean party control over the schools. An article in RED FLAG No. 6, for example, declared that a struggle persists "around the fundamental question of leadership" and that in this struggle it is necessary to "follow firmly the leadership of the working class, that is, the leadership of the party."

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The current RED FLAG article spells out in detail the authority of local party committees over schools and also discusses the party's relationship to the propaganda teams in the schools. Party committees have the responsibility of "conscientiously grasping the ideological revolutionization and organization of the propaganda teams" and must provide the necessary assistance to those team members "who aspire to join the party and are qualified to do so." Policy decisions concerning school work are to be made by the local party organization, and propaganda teams must then "be informed of the school work so that they can promptly implement it." In this way, it was argued, the propaganda teams will "give full play to their political role under the unified leadership of the party committee."

While revived party committees apparently will have the final say in educational policy decisions, the propaganda teams are not to be excluded from the decision-making process. It was argued that "a certain number of these propaganda teams should be maintained and their quality taken into consideration." Paying attention to the "quality" of the remaining members may suggest that most teams, at least at the university level, will, in effect, be reduced to their PLA cores. Operating in this manner, the teams, instructed to "participate in the leading groups at schools and departmental levels," probably will be better able to function as ideological watchdogs over the entire educational process.

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